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Abstract: A country's future sovereign debt depends on its domestic macroeconomic 
performance, its sustainability, its ability to attract foreign investments, and whether its 
economy can pay-off domestic and external debts. The global financial crisis shows that 
unsustainable debt is harmful to any economy regardless of size. Consequently, into the 
future, countries need to develop effective policy responses to compensate against 
possible sovereign debt and interest rate rises, otherwise their international ratings may 
be downgraded, and their economies weakened.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Around the globe observations demonstrate that the countries with expected near- 
future- inflation, unsustainable ballooning government spending and expected 
recession head towards a financial crisis unless significant policy transformations take 
place convincingly and before late. And whilst the recent sharp increase in advanced 
country sovereign debts has led to serious concerns about fiscal sustainability as well 
as their broader economic and financial market impacts, research on the relationship 
between sovereign or public debt and economic growth remains sparse, particularly 
from an empirical perspective. Most studies in this area focus on the impact of 
external debt and debt restructuring on growth in developing countries, with analyses 
of developed economies limited to a handful of recent papers.  
 
1990 was the era of convertibility for Argentina, when any citizen could go to the 
bank and convert their local currency to US dollar, the primary plan of such law was 
to guarantee the recognition of domestic currency to combat the 5000% hyperinflation 
that country suffered from in 1989. The plan seemed to work effectively since dollar 
Foreign Exchange Reserve (FER) was kept equal to the domestic money supply by 
Argentina central bank, and that resulted in quick and sharp decline in inflation and 
motivated spending. But at the same time activities like money laundry and tax 
evasion hit the economy harshly, additionally IMF continued lending Argentina, and  
as a result Argentina’s sovereign bond (debt) issued in USD increased even more. By 
early 2002 the amount the government owed to international market reached some 
US$ 95 billion, unemployment rose to a critical point of nearly 25% (according to 
FocusEconomics, 2009), GDP growth declined sharply and government announced to 
its international creditors that “ we are not going to pay” - - country defaulted that is 
largest sovereign default in history.   
 
Argentina’s debt default and Greece debt crisis (with many similarities between the 
two events) raise the critical significance of sovereign bonds. These cases reveal that 
if a nation cannot afford to pay the required foreign currency at bond repayment time 
and fails to service the debt, the risk of default increases, global distrust of financial 
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investors and of central bankers can lead to a financial turmoil in international market, 
where significant financial instability and fluctuation will become likely and perhaps 
another financial crisis could be well underway. To avoid another chaotic catastrophe 
the trends of the sovereign debt and macroeconomic performance of countries needs 
to be watched closely. The projection of the future patterns based on the past and 
current trends are imperative since it will provide adequate safety net before another 
financial calamity arrives. Needless to say if the extent of sovereign debt for a nation 
is too large to finance and service, bankruptcy is very likely to occur and by then there 
will be little motivation for other countries to cooperate with the system in finding an 
immediate solution. 
 
Furthermore, following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) many commentators have 
weighed in on the debate around regulation and the role of government and the law in 
minimising the risk of a repeat of similar economic events.  Within this debate there 
has been an ‘increasing focus on foreign debt and creditworthiness’ (Stevens 2010).  
Against the instability and uncertainty created by the GFC the debate has been 
reignited for a ‘sovereign insolvency regime’ with reference to the bankruptcy law in 
the US (Buckley 2002, 2003, 2009).  In 2002 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
itself looked at options for dealing with sovereign debt based on principles found in 
the bankruptcy laws of nations around the world (Richards 2002).  Even countries 
which have remained relatively unaffected by the GFC and the domino-effect of 
recent international sovereign debt crises continue their domestic reform agendas to 
keep pace or race ahead of international developments in areas such as capital 
standards and crisis management (Reserve Bank of Australia 2011).  As well as 
arguments for the need for an international ‘bankruptcy’ mechanism in international 
regulatory practices there has also been recognition by the international community 
that those banks with the potential to have widespread, global and systemic 
implications be identified and appropriately and carefully monitored to meet 
minimum standards (Reserve Bank of Australia 2011).  Albeit a less prominent issue, 
the role of the law and regulation is one which may become increasingly relevant in 
the current economic environment. 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Underpinning  
 
The theoretical literature tends to point to a negative relationship between sovereign 
debt and growth. According to Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), the conventional view 
is that debt stimulates aggregate demand and output in the short run, but crowds out 
capital and reduces output in the long run. The channels through which sovereign debt 
may affect economic growth are argued to be diverse. Drawing on contributions by 
Buchanan (1958), Meade (1958) and Musgrave (1959), Modigliani (1961) argues that 
government debt becomes a burden for future generations through a reduced flow of 
income resulting from a lower stock of private capital. Apart from a direct crowding-
out effect, he also points to the impact on long term interest rates, as the resulting 
reduction of private capital drives up its marginal product. Diamond (1965) augments 
this analysis to include the effect of taxes on the capital stock and to differentiate 
between external and internal debt. He concludes that, through the impact of taxes 
needed to finance interest payments, both types of public debt have a negative impact 
on the capital stock by reducing both the available lifetime consumption of taxpayers 
as well as their savings. He also contends that internal debt tends to produce a further 
2012 HICOB Proceedings 
Page524
3 
 
reduction in the capital stock due to the substitution of public debt for physical capital 
in individual portfolios.  
 
A number of studies have further investigated the interest rate effects of increased 
public debt. Surveying the empirical literature Gale and Orszag (2003) conclude that a 
projected increase in the budget deficit of 1% of GDP raises long term interest rates 
by 50 to 100 basis points. For a panel of 31 advanced and emerging market economics 
Baldacci and Kumar (2010) find that increases in public debt lead to a significant 
increase in long-term interest rates, with the precise magnitude dependent on initial 
fiscal, institutional and other structural conditions, as well as spill-overs from global 
financial markets. They conclude that large fiscal deficits and public debts are likely 
to put substantial upward pressure on sovereign bond yields in many developed 
economies over the medium term. 
 
The empirical literature regarding the relationship between sovereign debt and growth 
is primarily focused on the role of external debt in developing countries, much of it 
motivated by the “debt overhang hypothesis” (Krugman, 1985, Sachs, 1984, Sachs, 
1986). A debt overhang is said to occur where the debt service burden is so heavy that 
a large proportion of output accrues to foreign investors and creates disincentives to 
invest. Analysing the non-linear impact of external debt on growth across a panel of 
93 developing countries between 1969 and 1998, Patillo, Poirson and Ricci (2002) 
find that for a country with average indebtedness, doubling the debt ratio reduces 
annual per capita growth by between half and a full percentage point. They further 
find that the average impact of debt becomes negative at 35-40% of GDP with the 
predominant mechanism being to lower the efficiency of investment rather than its 
volume. In a subsequent paper aimed at specifically investigating the channels 
through which debt affects growth, the same authors find that the negative impact of 
high debt levels on growth operates both through a strong negative effect on physical 
capital accumulation and on total factor productivity growth, the contributions of each 
being approximately one-third and two-thirds respectively. 
 
Other studies that have similarly found a non-liner negative effect of external debt on 
growth include Cohen (1997), Smyth and Hsing (1995), and Clements et al. (2003). 
Analysing the relationship for a panel of 55 low income countries over the period 
1970-1999, the latter authors find a threshold level of external debt at approximately 
20-25% of GDP. By contrast Schclarek (2004) fails to find support for a concave 
relationship, instead concluding the existence of a negative linear relationship for a 
number of developing economies. Unlike Patillo, Poirson and Ricci (2004), 
Schclarek’s findings suggest that the relationship is mainly driven by effects on 
capital accumulation with limited evidence on the relationship between external debt 
and total factor productivity growth. 
 
In one of the few analyses to investigate the relationship for developed economies, 
Schclarek’s (2004) analysis also includes a number of industrial economies. He 
concludes however that no significant relationship exists between gross government 
debt and economic growth. In a ground breaking study into both advanced economies 
and emerging markets, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) employ data on 44 countries 
spanning 200 years, covering a diverse range of political systems, institutions, 
exchange rate and monetary arrangements, and historic circumstances. Searching for a 
systematic relationship between high public debt levels, growth and inflation, they 
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find that the relationship between public debt levels and growth is remarkably similar 
across emerging markets and advanced economies. Their main result is that although 
the link between growth and debt appears relatively weak at “normal” debt levels, 
median growth rates for countries with sovereign debt at over 90% of GDP are about 
1% lower than otherwise, with mean growth rates being several percent lower. With 
regard to inflation however, they find no systematic relationship between high debt 
levels and inflation for developed economies as a group (albeit with individual 
country exceptions, including the United States (see next section)), whilst high debt 
levels appear to coincide with higher inflation in emerging market economies.  
 
Investigating the debt-growth relationship for twelve euro area countries over a period 
of 40 years from 1970, Checherita and Rother (2010) find support for a concave 
relationship with a threshold point of 90-100% of GDP. Confidence intervals for this 
threshold suggest that the negative effect of high debt may start to appear at levels of 
70-80% of GDP which, they argue, calls for even more prudent sovereign debt 
policies.  They also find evidence of a negative linear relation between the annual 
change in the debt ratio, the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, and per-capita GDP growth. 
Analysing the channels through which public debt impacts growth, they find support 
for private saving, public investment, total factor productivity, and sovereign long-
term nominal and real interest rates.  
 
Kumar and Woo (2010) analyse a panel of advanced and emerging market economies 
over the period 1970-2007 and find that, on average, a 10 percentage point increase in 
the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in per capita growth of 
around 0.2 percentage points per year with the impact being smaller (approximately 
0.15%) in advanced economies. Similar to previous findings, they also find evidence 
of non-linearity with a threshold level of 90% of GDP. The effect largely reflects a 
decline in labour productivity growth, predominantly due to reduced investment and 
slower growth of capital stock per worker.  
 
 
3. The Case of the U.S 
 
In recent years United States’ public debt has seen rapid growth, climbing from 
36.2% of GDP in 2007 to 53.0% in 2009, and further to 62.3% in 2010 , and above 
90% in 2011 (CIA World Factbook).  
 
Despite levels continuing to soar, an analysis of the economic impacts of US debt is 
virtually absent from the literature. As previously cited, papers by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010), Kumar and Woo (2010), and Schclarek (2004) have included the 
United States within a panel of advanced economies. Although a single country 
investigation of the relationship between growth and debt is absent, as an appendix to 
their main findings, Kumar and Woo (2010) have extended their analysis to provide 
an analytical perspective for the United States. Employing a simple Cobb-Douglas 
production framework and assuming that each dollar of debt crowds out one dollar of 
capital in the long run, they estimate that an increase in the ratio of net debt to DGP of 
40% over the five years from 2010-2015 will lead to a growth slowdown of around 
0.8%: or 0.2% per year on average for a 10% increase in government debt. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010) also note that, whilst for a panel data set of advanced economies 
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there appears to be no correlation between inflation and high debt levels, for the US, 
debt levels of over 90% are linked to significantly elevated inflation. 
 
While the US government increases the government expenditure bizarrely to renovate 
the domestic economy, there increases the urgent need to raise enough cash to finance 
this huge spending. This has been partially funded through domestic and international 
borrowing, whereby government sells treasury securities and bonds of different 
maturity.  Obviously this borrowing makes a sizeable increase in national and external 
debt, which has climbed above $15 trillion in 2009 and still rising. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- Source: based on data collected from U.S Census Bureau 
 
Foreign purchase of US securities is what is called “US sovereign debt”. Sovereign 
debt is more worrying and important than domestic public debt, as domestic debt is 
normally injected back into the domestic economy through fiscal spending and 
different types of investments. Therefore significant part of interest payments goes to 
US citizens. However, the sovereign debt indicates absolute leakage out of the US 
economy due to the international holders of US government bonds and treasury 
securities. This generates a bigger economic problem as US is giving away the future 
income to support today’s expense. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2- Source: based on data collected from U.S Census Bureau, includes net purchase of T- 
bonds, Corporation bonds, corporate bonds and corporate stocks. 
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U.S. Treasury securities are the most important means of funding US federal budget 
debt, which totalled $10 trillion as of 2008.  US treasury securities held 70% share of 
government debt in 2009.    
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.a : US Debt-GDP ratio and budget deficit 
 -Source: data are collected from US department of treasury and US Census Bureau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.b : US Debt-GDP ratio and budget deficit projection, estimation starts after 2008 
 -Source: Based on data from US department of treasury and US Census Bureau 
 
  
The existing trends aren’t promising.  Growth seems to be slow even though inflation 
is kept low as a result of low interest rate policy during the recession, GDP growth in 
2009 was only 0.2%, and future estimation doesn’t depict strong and sustainable 
growth.  Specially, interest rate rise in early 2010 created a drag on the economy, 
nevertheless US still is obliged to pay interest on what it is borrowed, and borrowing 
on top of borrowing is in fact poisoning the future of the economy and jeopardizing 
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6. Future of US dollar! 
Rapidly rising international indebtedness has seen the global hegemony of the US 
dollar increasingly called into question, raising the prospect of the collapse of the 
dollar as a global reserve currency. A significant strand of analysis evident within the 
literature is concerned with the existence of a viable alternative to the dollar in the 
event of a crisis of confidence.  
 
Cooper (2009) analyses several alternatives to the dollar and concludes that it is 
unlikely to be replaced in the next decade at least. He argues that whilst the euro has 
increased markedly in use since its circulation in 2002, the euro capital market 
remains fragmented, with varying degrees of liquidity, dependent on the type of 
security. Given that holders of international reserves are unable to hold euros but must 
hold euro-denominated securities instead, such an environment poses a significant 
barrier to the euro overtaking the dollar as a reserve currency. He contends that a 
deliberate international decision to create a synthetic currency unit, possibly through 
augmenting the special drawing right (SDR), a synthetic currency unit of the 
International Monetary Fund, is the most likely candidate. However he argues that the 
task would confront formidable practical difficulties, such that the prospective gains 
would have to be sufficiently large to induce governments to willingly overcome the 
practical difficulties and adopt the necessary exchange rate policies to give a new 
international currency a compelling advantage over the dollar. 
 
Many arguments within the economics literature point to the role of economy size, 
among other factors, as a determinant of international currencies (Helleiner, 2008). 
The re-emergence of China as an economic power therefore raises the prospect of the 
yuan as a viable alternative to the dollar. Bowles and Wang (2008) however argue 
that firstly, the yuan currently plays only a very limited role as a medium of exchange, 
store of value or unit of account for official uses. Secondly they argue, history shows 
that in the case of Britain, the pound sterling continued to play a significant role in the 
international monetary system for a considerable period after the country’s economic 
pre-eminence was lost. They therefore surmise that should China overtake the US as 
the world’s largest economy by mid-century, as Goldman Sachs (2003) predict, the 
dollar would likely remain the dominant currency for a significant time thereafter. 
Rajan and Kiran (2006) further argue that the significant weaknesses of China’s 
financial system, a lack of depth of its financial markets, non-convertibility of the 
yuan, and persistent restraints on its capital account, make the possibility of the yuan 
usurping the dollar very remote. 
 
Helleiner (2008) argues for an increase in the scope of debate concerning the future of 
the dollar to include the political determinants. He proposes a framework that 
identifies two distinct channels through which politics may influence the international 
standing of the dollar. Firstly, he argues that politics is important in an indirect sense 
through its impact on three key economic features of international currencies: 
confidence, liquidity, and transactional networks. Secondly, he contends that politics 
also plays a direct role in the sense that a state may choose to back a currency not 
because of its inherent economic attractiveness but due to other political factors. In 
this vein Bowles and Wang (2008) argue  that the future of the dollar is largely 
dependent on the ability of China and the US to effectively manage the tensions 
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and running the risk of high inflation and dollar devaluation, which serves to lower 
the living standard of US residents. However, the problem starts when the borrowing 
has been repaid and banks start to expand their loans or purchase even more of 
government bonds, as a results money supply increases sharply and dollar devaluates 
to new low.  
 
The possibility that US defaults on its sovereign debt is seems low at least in the next 
decade, since entire US government debt is in US dollar, and they always can issue 
and print more bills. This doesn’t mean that the USD remains appreciated; it indicates 
that US can always repay to its creditors, and if worse come to worst, the Federal 
Reserve could monetise the debt, nevertheless lift up in inflation rate , devaluation of 
USD and lower demand for US dollar would be other expected outcomes.  
 
However, the picture changes for those countries, particularly developing countries, 
that need to issue their debt in another currency (say USD) rather their own. They do 
not have the reassurance of borrow from their own reserve banks to maintain and pay 
off the debt. The economic turmoil has made international investors around the world 
more concerned about these countries getting closer to bankruptcy, and as a result the 
insurance of sovereign debt is more expensive and has affect countries ratings by 
credit rating agencies. .    
   
 
  
7. Will sovereign debt cause another financial crisis? 
 
Obviously the debt will become a problem if it is excessively large. High debt will 
have serious real and financial consequences. US treasury have to refinance $ 3.5 
trillion in short term debt in 2010 that is about 27% of US GDP. How US is going to 
finance that? 
 
Total domestic savings in the U.S. is estimated to be around 12% of US GDP in 2010 
(according to Economy Watch data base), that is $1.5 trillion, and if we assume the 
entire national saving dollars are put into US treasury debt, US is still going to be $2 
trillion short. That's a yearly funding obligation equal to approximately 16% of GDP.  
Also, it is very unlikely that several central banks around the world continue 
purchasing US securities including Russia and India, which by the way have already 
started buying gigantic amounts of gold instead.  
 
What about higher taxation? Will that be a part of solution to refinance the debt? Not 
likely, since higher taxation during recession and economic turmoil would only drags 
the country deeper into an economic and financial disaster and creates distortions.  
  
  
Blowing up of irresponsible fiscal deficits, gigantic purchase of US treasury bonds by 
foreigners can naturally postpone the next financial crisis, but today most countries 
have their own deficit to finance. It is thoughtless to expect the world to continue 
financing US deficit in the new decade. US current and estimated deficits are too huge 
compare to current and future world saving to expect that outcome. 
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8. Conclusion  
 
Although the outlook of debt-to-GDP can be an informative way to recognise a 
country's debt position, the future of a country's sovereign debt depends on domestic 
macroeconomic performance and its sustainability as well as the ability to attract 
foreign investments.  The question is whether the economy is capable of paying off 
domestic and external debts. But an implicit lesson learned from recent global 
financial crisis is that sustaining excessive debt is extremely harmful to economies, 
regardless of the size of debtor country.  
 
It is clear that the U.S. economy relies heavily on the foreign capital to fund its federal 
budget deficit. Also it is obvious that US dollar has had the privilege of financing the 
government budget deficit by issuing more dollars since the financial health of other 
currencies is profoundly depended on US dollar, and it is very unlikely that countries 
around the globe tend to abandon US dollar since everybody is afraid that this sets off 
a sequence of reactions and would backfire and affect them negatively, and central 
banks around the globe are trying to avoid any unpopular consequence, therefore the 
dollar global downfall might take longer than some may suggest.  
 
Next decade is probably going to be turbulent years due to fast increasing sovereign 
risk. The interest rates already began to rise since February 2010 in the US and other 
developed and developing countries around the globe that reveals the actual costs of 
the recent financial crisis. Countries like US and UK with large amount of sovereign 
debt need to come up with effective and realistic plan. According to Moody’s credit 
rating agencies “If there is not a policy response, then the rating will be under threat 
in the next two or three years.” 
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